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IN
[Crim. No. 11647.

[70 C.2d

RE HAYES

In Bank.

Mar 17, 1969.]

In re DAVID OIJIVER HAYES on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law-Double Punishment-Scope of Statutes.-Pen.
Code, § 654, proscribing mUltiple punishment, governs violations not only of the Penal Code, but also of the penal
provisions of other codes, including the Vehicle Code.
[2] Id.-Identity of Offenses-Multiple Punishment: Application·
of Tests.-If the statutory proscription against multiple punishment (Pen. Code, § 654) applies under any enunciated test
employed to determine its applicability, a contrary result
under another test is irrelevant.
[3a,3b] Id.-Identity of Offenses-Multiple Punishment: Application of Tests.-The "act or omission" that entails multiple
criminal violations for which multiple punishment is precluded
under Pen. Code, § 654, relates only to a criminal act or
omission, just as the single "intent and objective" held under
decisional law to preclude multiple punishment for a series of
criminal acts relates only to a single criminal intent and
motive. The proper approach, to determine whether the statute applies, is first to isolate the criminal acts involved and
then to examine them for identity.
[ 4a-4c] Id.-Identity of Offenses-Multiple Punishment: Application of Testa.-One who drove a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and with the knowledge that his
license had been suspended was guilty of two criminal acts,
namely violation of Veh. Code, § 23102, and violation of Veh.
Code, § 14601, respectively, and it was immaterial that both
criminal acts were committed simultaneously or that they
shared the single act, and the single intent and objective, of
driving from one place to another, conduct that in and of itself
is neutral and noncriminal. (Disapproving People v. Morris,
237 Cal.App.2d 773 [47 Cal.Rptr. 253], to the extent that observations therein on multiple prosecutions might relate to a
multiple punishment problem.)
[5] Id.-Double Prosecution: Double Punishment Distinguished.The preclusion of multiple prosecution under Pen. Code, § 654,
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 269.5; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal
Law, § 189.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 173 et seq; Am.Jur.2d,
Criminal Law, § 165 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1475(1); [2, 3]
Criminal Law, §§ 140(5), 1475(1); [4] Criminal Law, §§ 140(5);
Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §§ 387a, 388; [5] Criminal
Law, §§ 66.5,1475(1).
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is separate and distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural
safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related to
the punishment to be imposed, and double prosecution may be
precluded even when double punishment is permissible.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to review the imposition
of two sentences for the simultaneous violation of two unrelated penal provisions of the Vehicle Code. Order to show
cause discharged; writ denied.
Kenneth M. Wells, Public Defender, and Charles G. Fredericks, Assistant Public Defender, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws and Arnold O.Overoye,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
MOSK, J.-On December 30, 1966, petitioner David Oliver
Hayes drove a motor vehicle for some 13 blocks in violation of
Vehicle Code section 14601 (with knowledge of a suspended
license) and Vehicle Code section 23102 (while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor). He pleaded guilty to ~nd
was sentenced for both offenses. Petitioner now asserts that
imposition of sentences for both violations is contrary to the
. proscription against multiple punishment contained in Penal
Code section 654. We have concluded that petitioner's contention lacks merit.
[1] Section 654 provides that ee An act or omission which
is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of
this code may be punished under either of such provisions.
but in no case can it be punished under more than one. . . ."
The interdiction is not limited to the provisions of the Penal
Code, but embraces penal provisions in other codes as well,
including those found in the Vehicle Code. (Neal v. State of
California (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 18 fn. 1 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607,
357 P.2d 839] ; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Ca1.2d 711 [204
P.2d 321].)
[2] The key to application of section 654 is in the phrase
"act or omission": a defendant may be punished only once
for each distinct "act or omission" committed. There have
been numerous attempts in the cases to define a single "act,"
with varying degrees of clarity. Section 654 has been held to
apply, for example, where the multiple violations are "necessarily included offenses" (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

)

606

'i

':

,
,

IN RE HAYES

[70 C.2d

2d 175, 186 [217 P.2d 1]) and where there is a single "intent
and objective" underlying a course of criminal ,conduct
(N cal v. State of California (1960) supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11) but
not where there are multiple victims (id.). Most of the cases
construing section 654 can be resolved by application of one
or the other of these theories. (See, e.g., In re Ford (1961) 66
Ca1.2d 183 [57 Cal.Rptr. 129, 424 P.2d 681] [kidnaping of
three victims] ; In re Ward (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 672 [51 Cal.
Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] [kidnaping with intent to rob and
robbery] ; People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577 [320 P.2d 5]
[abortion and resulting death]; People v. Craig (1941) 17
Ca1.2d 453 [110 P.2d 403] [rape and statutory rape] ; People
v. Pater (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 921 [73 Cal.Rptr. 823]
[grand theft-auto and driving vehicle without owner's consent].) Unfortunately, these formulae are of only limited
utility in the instant case, and we therefore begin anew with
a direct analysis of the statute and its application to the facts
before us. 1
To put petitioner's entire adventure into a few words: he
drove his car with an invalid license and while intoxicated.
Initially, it is temptingly easy to extract, as petitioner urges
us to do, the single act of "driving," obviously common to
both of the charged offenses, and to apply section 654 to this
case on the theory that" driving" was petitioner's only "act
or omission." However, to do so would be no more justified
than to extract the act of "possession" from a charge of
possessing two different items of contraband, an approach
long rejected by our courts. (E.g., People v. Schroeder (1968)
264 Cal.App.2d 217, 227-228 [70 Cal.Rptr. 491] [multiple punishment for simultaneous possession of various narcotic drugs, not precluded by section 654]; People v. Lockwood (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 75, 82-83 [61 Cal.Rptr. 131]
[same] ; People v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 350-351
[337 P.2d 570] [same]; People v. Mandell (1949) 90 Cal.App.
2d 93, 98-99 [202 P.2d 348] [same]; People v. Wasley (1966)
245 Cal.App.2d 383 [53 Cal.Rptr. 877] [possession of diiferent illegal weapons] ; cf. People v. Schroeder, supra, 264 Cal.
App.2d at pp. 228-229 [possession of single narcotic a single offense] ; People v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490 [260
lOur analysis herein is iu no way intended to preclude application of
the above tests where appropriate, any more than those tests themselves
are mutually exclusive. It is only because we find aU the foregoing formu.
lae inapplicable that we resort to the present approach. If under any of
the enunciated tests the proscription of section 654 applies, a contrary
result under another test is irrelevant.

\

\
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P.2d 27] [possession and sale of same narcotic].) [Sa] We
cannot overlook the crucial element: section 654 rcfers
not to any physical act or omission which might perchance be
common to all of a defendant's violations, but to a defendant's criminal acts or omissions. (See, e.g., In re Johnson
(1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 395 [54 Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393] ;
People v. Quinn (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 551, 555 [39 Cal.Rptr. 393,
393 P.2d 705] ; People v. Brown (1958) supra, 49 Ca1.2d 577,
590; People v. Branch, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 496.) 2
Indeed, section 654 itself makes this distinction evident,
since it refers to an act or omission "made punishable" by
different statutes. 3 The neutral act of driving, like the mere
act of possession in the foregoing cases, when viewed in a
vacuum, is not' 'made punishable" by any statute.
The proper approach, therefore, is to isolate the various
criminal acts involved, and then to examine only those acts
for identity. [48.] In the instant case the two criminal acts
are (1) driving with a suspended license and (2)' driving
while intoxicated; they are in no sense identical or equivalent.
Petitioner is not being punished twice-because he cannot be
punished at all-for the "act of driving." He is being penalized once for his act of driving with an invalid license and
once for his independent act of driving while intoxicated.'
Moreover, we must not confuse simultaneity with identity:
in both of the above situations----driving as in this case and
possession of contraband in the cited cases-the defendant
committed two simultaneous criminal acts, which coincidentally had in common an identical noncriminal act. The two
simultaneous criminal acts of possessing substance X and possessing substance Y share the common, "neutral" act of possessing, just as they necessarily share the common factor of
lack of a valid prescription for the drugs. Likewise, the two
2The language in J'ohn801l. is typical: "The basic principle that forbids
mUltiple punishment for one criminal act [citations] precludes infliction
of more than one punishment for [a] series of acts directed toward one
criminal objective•••• " (Italics added.) (65 Ca1.2d at p. 395 (per
Traynor, C. J.).}
8Compare former section 1938 of the New York Penal Law, referred
to in Neal as "identical with" section 654, which uses the specific language, "An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable.
• • ." (Italics added.)
'On the other hand, the single criminal act of driving with knowledge
of an invalid license is arguably "made punis}lable" by both Vehicle
Code section 14601 (driving with a suspended or revoked license) and
Vehicle Code section 12500 (unlicensed driving); and section 654 would
therefore preclude multiple punishment under both sections.

)
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simultaneous-but distinct-criminal acts of driving with a
suspended license and driving while intoxicated share the
common, noncriminal act of driving. I) On the date in question
petitioner's act of driving was criminal and simultaneously
violated two statutes because and only because of the presence
of both the unrelated accompanying acts of voluntary intoxication and knowing possession of a suspended license. Similarly, for example, if an individual went for a walk in pos·
session of a loaded gun while he was intoxicated and
unclothed, he would by the single neutral act of walking-or,
more accurately, being in a "public place "-simultaneously
viola.te three separate and unrelated statutes. (Pen. Code,
§§ 12031, subd. (a); 647, subd. (f); 314.)6 Those three stat·
utes, however, would be violated not by the one noncriminal
act of being in a public place but necessarily by three simul·
taneous though separate criminal acts. Once again, we must
distinguish identical noncriminal acts from simultaneous
criminal a.cts "made punishable" by law. T
In attempting to equate simultaneity with identity, petitioner argues that "There was no evidence his driving with·
out a license preceded the commencement of the driving while
liAs a further illustration of the analogy: Petitioner could be said to.
have driven in possession of a suspended license and in "possession" (in
his system) of intoxicating liquor. Again, possession is the neutral or
noncriminal identical 'factor; but the criminal acts are distinctive.
°Petitioner attaches significance to the fact that driving was an essential element in both of his offenses, citing a statement first made in
In re Ohapman (1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 390 [273 P.2d 817]: "It is on17.
when the two offenses are committed by the 8ame act or when that aot
is essential to both that they may not both be punished.' I. (Italics
added.) Aside from the dubious vitality of this dic~um (see Peopltl v.
Oollins (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [33 Cal.Rptr. 638]), "essentiality" in and of itself was and is not a sufficient test ot the applicability of section 654. On closer scrutiny, in tact, the quoted statement
itself presupposes the existence of a single ("same") act; and we have
seen that the only single acts that are relevant tor purposes ot section
654 are criminal acts. In the example suggested above, none of the hypothetical acts is a crime if committed in private i thus being or walking in
a public place, like driving in the instant case or like possession and lack
of a prescription in the narcotics example, is a necessary element in all
three crimes. Yet this fact does not make those neutral elements in them. selves punishable or criminal, for none is by itself a complete criminal
act. Thus the fortuitous identity of "essential" neutral elements remains
irrelevant for our purposes.
7To the possession and driving examples might well be added the cases
which permit multiple punishment where a single criminal act haa more
than one victim. (See Neal v. State of Oalifornia (1960) supra, 55 Cal.2d
11, 20-21, and cases therein cited.) There might, tor example, be one
common act of shooting a gun, but distinct criminal acts ot killing victim
X and killing victim Y. However, as we indicated in Neal, this particular
test takes in additional considerations, such as degree ot culpability,
which migbt be inappropriate to apply in other contexts.

\
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under the influence." Thus if petitioner had begun driving
while intoxicated at 11 :50 p.m., and at midnight his license
had expired but he had continued to drive, he apparently
would concede that he could be punished for the two distinct
acts of driving while intoxicated (before midnight) and driving with an expired license (after midnight). This arbitrary
and wholly artificial distinction is unpersuasive. While separation in time may, in some contexts, make the legal separation of acts more apparent (see, e.g., In re lVard (1966)
supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672, 678; Seiterle v. Superior Oourt (1962)
67 Ca1.2d 397, 401·403 [20 Cal.Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d 697] ; People
v. Howell (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 787, 792 [54 Cal.Rptr.
92]), the converse does not necessarily follow. Proximity in
time between criminal events does not preclude multiple punishment (People v. Slobodion (1948) 31 Ca1.2d 555 [191 P.2d
1]); and petitioner's acts were neither more nor less multiple
because of the fortuitous fact that they were completely,
rather than only partly, simultaneous. (People v. Wasley
(1966) supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 383, 387.)8
~ can we subscribe to a contention that because petitioner
m~y have had only one "intent and objective "-driving: when he committed the two violations, he comes within the
ambit of the test established in Neal v. State of Oalifornia
· (1960) supra, 55 Cal.2d 11. In Neal, the defenp.ant had
attempted murder by means of arson (burning down the victims' house by igniting gasoline therein). We viewed that
circumstance as an indivisible "course of criminal conduct,"
the criminal act of arson being only the means toward an
ultimate criminal objective of murder. We stated that where
there was only a single "intent and objective" involved in
such a course of criminal conduct, section 654 precluded multiple punishment;
Here neither of the two violations can realistically be
viewed as a "means" toward the other and as such a part of
a single course of criminal conduct, in the sense that the arson
in Neal was committed not to burn property but only as a
I

8The Attorney General, in apparent answer to petitioner's argument,
has made a belated attempt to establish that petitioner may have been
observed by the arresting officer at two different times, so that technically
the offenses charged were not "simultaneous." It is just such strained
rationale that a test dependent on simultaneity would engender. As stated
in People v. Pater (1968) supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 926, a "necessarily included offense" case, "Neither clocks, calendars nor county
boundaries convert one continuing course of conduct into a series of
criminal acts."
70 C.JcS-ZO
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means toward the single objective of murder. Moreover, the
petitioner's intent and objective to drive from one place to
another is no more relevant to our analysis than what he
intended to do when he arrived there. (See In re Ward.
(1966) supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672, 676.) [3b] Just as it is the'
criminal "act or omission" to which section 654 refers, it is
the criminal" intent and objective" that we established as
the test in Neal. (E.g., I'll re Johnson (1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d
393, 395 [intent to sell heroin] ; I'll re Ward (1966) supra, 64
Ca1.2d 672, 676 [intent to rob].) In Neal we found to be
crucial 110t the defendant's possible intent and objective to
acquire money, to gain revenge or to ignite gasoline, but only
his intent and objective to commit murder.9 Although the
absence of a single intent and objective does not necessarily
preclude application of section 654 (see fn. 1 ante), it is clear
that under the instant circumstances this test of Neal cannot
be of aid to defendant.
[4b] Petitioner relies heavily upon People v. Morris
(1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 773 [47 Cal.Rptr. 253], which ·in a
similar factual situation declared that section 654 proscribed
multiple prosecutions for drunk driving and an invalid
license. lO [5] As we pointed out in Neal, however, "Section 654's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and
distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule
against . multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard
against harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be precluded
even when double punishment is permissible." (Italics
added.) Neal v. State of Oalifornia (1960) supra, 55 Ca1.2d
11, 21.) [40] Therefore we need not reexamine at this time
the validity of the conclusions in Morris as to multiple .prosecutions, other than to observe that they are disapprOVed to the
extent they might relate to a multiple punishment problem. l1
9Thus had the defendant there had the completely independent criminal objectives of murder (perhaps for vengeance) and burning the house
(to collect fire insurance), or had he attempted to kill his victims with
a gun and then set fire to their house as an afterthought, he would have
been punishable for both arson and attempted murder. (See PeopltJ V.
Massie (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 899, 908 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869] ;
Seiterle v. Superior Court (19U2) supra, 57 Ca1.2d 397, 401.)
lOA majority of the Morris court, given substantially the same argument presented to us, rejecteJ tIle" criminal act" de1inition for section
654 and appeared to apply the Chapman test of "essentiality." (But see
dissent by Whelan, J., id., p. 777.)
llWe note that even where the issue is multiple prosecution, the provi·
sions of section 654 cannot be employed to Plislead the court. Thus if a

\

\
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In summation, then, section 654 of the Penal Code proscribes multiple punishment for a single "act or omission
which is made punishable" by different statutes, i.e., a single
criminal act or omission. Since the mere act of driving is
made punishable by no statute, it is not the type of act or
omission referred to in section 654. The acts "made punishable" which this petitioner committed were (1) driving with
a suspended license and (2) driving while intoxicated, two
separate and distinct criminal acts; that they were committed
simultaneously and that they share in common the neutral
noncriminal act of driving does not render petitioner's punishment for both crimes in conHict with Penal Code section
654.
The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for
writ of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., and Burke, J., concurred.

"-.

TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent.
Section 654 of the Penal Code provides that "An act or
omtSSion which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case lean it be punished under more
than one. " Underlying this deceptively simple language is a
legislative determination that essentially unitary criminal
activity shall not be punished more than once regardless of
how many distinct crimes it may comprise. The statute "has
been applied not only where there was but one 'act' in the
ordinary sense . . . but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it
comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished
under more than one statute within the meaning of section
654." (People v. Brown (1958) 49 Ca1.2d 577, 591 [320 P.2d
5].) Since its application is not limited to cases in which the
identical conduct violates two statutes or one offense is necessarily included in the other l (Neal v. State of California
greater violation is concealed in order to gain "immunity" by prosecution for a lesser crime, section 654 will not apply. (Kellett v. 8uperior
Court (1966) 63 Ca1.2d 822, 827-828 [48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206];
Gail v. Municipal Oourt (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 1005 [66 Cal.Rptr. 91];
Hampton v. Municipal Oourt (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 689 [51 Cal.Rptr.
760].)
lFor example, a single act of statutory rape would in every case also
constitute contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and the latter
offense is therefore necessarily included in the former. (People v. Greer
(1947) 30 CaUd 589, 597-598 [184 P.2d 512].)

I
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(1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 18 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839], and
cases cited), the words an "act . . . made punishable . . . by
different provisions" do not refer to the entire criminal conduct proscribed by each provision but to conduct significantly
common to both.
Thus, in People v. Logan (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [260
P.2d 20], we held that a defendant who committed robbery by
striking his victim with a baseball bat could be punished only
once for that act, since the "one act of inflicting force with
the bat cannot both be punished as assault with a deadly
weapon and availed of by the People as the force necessary to
constitute the crime of robbery." Although the act of striking the victim was not by itself made punishable by different
provisions of the Penal Code, it nevertheless fell within section 654 because it was an essential element of both the robbery and the assault. (In re Ohapman (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 385,
389 [273 P.2d 817].)
Moreover, there is no requirement that the act common to
both crimes be punishable before section 654 comes into play.
In Neal v. State of Oalifornia, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, the act
common to both crimes was the act, not punishable by itself,
of throwing lighted gasoline. It was made punishable as arson
because the gasoline was thrown into a house and as attempted murder because it was thrown onto human beings.
Since it "is the singleness of the act and not of the' offense
that is determinative" (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Ca1.2d
175, 187 [217 P.2d 1]), Neal could not be punished for both
of those crimes. In People v. Oraig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 458
[110 P.2d 403], the act common to both statutory and forcible
rape was the act, innocent by itself, of sexual intercourse.
(See In re Lane (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 99, 104 122 Cal.Rptr. 857,
372 P.2d 897].) Although the additional elements of the force
used and the age of the victim made the act punishable under
different subdivisions of section 261 of the Penal Code,' the
defendant could be punished only once.
The foregoing cases control this case, for petitioner's single
act of driving was an essential element, indeed the only active
dement, of the two crimes charged, namely, driving with
knowledge that his driving privilege was suspended (Veh.
Code, § 14601) and d"iving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. (Vell. Code, § 23102.)
Cases involving simultaneous possession of different items
of contraband are obviously not to the contrary (e.g., People
v. Schroeder (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 217, 227-228 [70 Cal.

)
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Rptr. 491] [multiple punishment for simultaneous possession
of various narcotic drugs, 110t precluded by section 654];
People v. Lockwood (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 75, 82-83 [61 Cal.
Rptr. 131] [same]; People v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d
344,350-351 [337 P.2d 570] [same]; People v. Mandell (1949)
90 Cal.App.2d 93, 98-99 [202 P.2d 348] [same]; People v.
Wasley (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 383, 387 [53 Cal.Rptr. 877]
[possession of different illegal weapons]; cf. People v.
Schroeder, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at pp. 228-229 [possession
of single narcotic a single offense] ; People v. Branch (1953)
119 CaI.App.2d 490, 495-496 [260 P.2d 27] [possession and
sale of same narcotic]), for the possession of one item is not
essential to the possession of another separate item. One does
not possess in the abstract; possession is meaningless unless
something is possessed. The possession of each separate item
is therefore a separate act of possession.
Of course, had petitioner been convicted of a "crime" of
being intoxicated and a "crime" of knowing that his driving
privilege was suspended, the possession cases would be in
point and section 654 would not preclude punishing petiti~or both offenses even though he committed them simultaneously. In such a case there would be no act of petitioner
common to the two crimes. Petitioner, however, was not convicted of being intoxicated and knowing that his driving privilege was suspended but of a single act of driving while intoxicated and while his driving privilege was suspended. It is the
singleness of that act that is determinative.
The Attorney General contends, however, that Vehicle Code
sections 14601 and 23102 have different public purposes directed at distinct evils, and that the driver who violates both
statutes simultaneously should be doubly punished because he
is invading two social interests that the Legislature had designated for distinct protection by the enactment of two different statutes. In a jurisdiction without a multiple punishment
~le like that of Penal Code section 654, this "distinct evil"
test might aid the courts in ascertaining whether the Legislature intended cumulative punishments for simultaneous violations of statutes like Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102.
(See Twice in Jeopardy (1965) 75 Yale L.J. 262, 320; Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy (1949) 58
Yale L.J. 513, 523.) In California, however, when the rule of
section 654 precluding multiple punishment applies, the
courts cannot invoke the "distinct evil" test to evade that
statutory rule. (But see People v. Winchell (1967) 248 Cal.

)
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App.2J 580, 596 [56 Cal.Rptr. 782] ; People v. Wasley, supra,
245 Cal.App.2d 383, 386; People v. Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App.
2d Supp. 928, 942 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670].) 2
Moreover, any notion that a California court can multiply
sentences because defendant's single act violates statutes that,
in the court's view, vindicate different societal interests
should have been dispelled by decisions such as People v.
Brown, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 577, 590 (defendant cannot be sentenced both for criminal abortion and for murder caused by
the same act), and People v. Craig, supra, 17 Cal.2d 453, 457
(defendant cannot be sentenced for both statutory rape and
forcible rape committed by one act of intercourse forced upon
a 16-year-old girl; compare, People v. McOoUum (1931) 116
Cal.App. 55, 58 [2 P.2d 432], a prosecution for both statutory
rape and incest resulting from defendant's one act of intercourse with his 16-year-old daughter; the trial court correctly
anticipated the Oraig decision, but the appellate court withheld judgment on the question).
The Attorney General contends that multiple punishment
should be allowed in accord with the statement in Neal v.
State of Oalifornia, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20, that" the purpose
of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure
that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with
his criminal liability." The Neal opinion made the quoted
statement in the course of an inquiry into legislativ~ purposea
2Both Winchell and Wasley correctly upheld dual sentences for simul·
taneous but different" acts." In Winchell the defendant simultaneously
violated Penal Code section 12021, forbidding possession by an ex-convict
of a pistol capable of being concealed on his person, and Penal.Code
section 466, forbidding possession of "a picklock, crow, keybit, or other
instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or enter into any
building." In Wasley the defendant simultaneously violated section
12021, proscribing possession of a concealable pistol by an ex-convict,
and section 12020, proscribing possession of a sawed-off shotgun by ~'any
person." The decisions mention the different public purposes served by
the two statutes violated by the respective defendants, but they do not
purport to announce a "distinct evils" test contrary to section 654.
Since possession of a physical object is an "act" within the meaning
of section 654, the defendant who possesses two different kinds of contraband in violation of two different statutes is committing two different
, , acts" of proscribed possession.
The Poe case, supra, 236 Ca1.App.2d SUpPa 928, 942, unlike Winchell
and Wasley, decided the double punishment issue erroneously and should
therefore be disapproved. In Poe precisely the same conduct of the
defendants was a trespass proscribed by Penal Code section 602, sub·
division (j), and a contempt proscribed by Penal Code section 166,
subdivision 4. The appellate court upheld dual sentences f?r this single
"act" on the theory that the trespass was a crime agalUst property
whereas contempt was a crime against the authority of the superior court.
3It is a legislative, not a judicial, function to fix the extent of punish.
ment that can be imposed for any particular crime or group of crimes.
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with respect to the extent of punishment of a defendant who
criminally injures or kills more than one victim. In holding
that section 654 does not forbid the separate punishment of a
defendant's multiple crimes of violence that harm multiple
victims, even though a single physical movement of the
defendant is the one common cause of injuries or deaths of
the several victims, Neal speaks of the multiple victim problem in terms of cuIpability 4 and consequences. 5 Moreover,
under the orthodox theory of crime on which the Legislature
based the Penal Code, the act of killing A is essentially distinct from the act of killing B even when a single muscular
contraction of the defendant is the common cause of both
deaths. The concept of punishment "commensurate with his·
criminal liability," used in Neal as an aid to the determination of legislative purpose in a multiple victim case, cannot be
wrenched from that context and invoked in the present case to
justify ignoring the controlling precedents upon which the
court in Neal relied in holding that Neal could not be punished
bJlt,.h for arson and attempted murder.
/' The Attorney General aIso contends that petitioner's uninSubject only to constitutional limitations, the Legislature can define
erimes and set their punishments as it sees fit. (Bell v. United States
(1955) 349 U.S. 81, 82 [99 L.Ed. 905, 909, 75 S.Ct. 620]; People v.
Knowle, (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 181 [217 P.2d 1]; In re RosenCf'antz
(1928) 205 Cal. 534, 537-538 [271 P. 902].) The courts cannot impose
criminal penalties for conduct that the Legislature has not made punishable (United States v. Wiltberger (1820) 18 U.S. 76, 93 [5 L.Ed. 37,
42]; Matter of Ellsworth (1913) 165 Cal. 677,681 [133 P. 272]; Havemeyer v. Superior Oourt (1890) 84 Cal. 327, 376 [24 P. 121, 18 Am.St.
Rep. 192, 10 L.R.A. 627]; Pen. Code, § 15) or adjudge punishment in
excess of that authorized by the Legislature. (PeopZe v. Lein (1928) 204
Cal. 84, 87 [266 P. 536]; People v. Riley (1874) 48 Cal. 549; In r6 Rye
(1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 594:, 596 [313 P.2d 914]; In re Oarmignani
(1925) 71 Cal.App. 632, 633 [235 P. 1033].) The Legislature can and
does command multiple punishments for some crimes (e.g., Pen. Code,
§§ 67, 68, 98 [disqualification from or forfeiture of office in addition to
any other punishment for certain offenses]) and it authorizes the courts
in their discretion to impose multiple punishments for others (e.g., the
familiar statutory provision that a crime is punishable by imprisonment,
fine, or both). The Legislature could also, if it saw fit to do so, expressly
command or authorize multiple sentences for a group of crimes, however
elosely they might be related. Instead, the California Legislature, so far
8S multiple sentences for related crimes are concerned, has seen fit to
enact the general multiple punishment preclusion of section 654.
4" A defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm
mOre than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several perBons is more culpable than' a defendant who harms only one person."
(55 Ca1.2d at p. 20.)
Ci"Seetion 654 is not ' .•. applicable where ••. one act has two
results each of which is an act of violence against the person of a separate individual.'" (55 Cal.2d at pp. 20-21, quoting from People v.
Brannon (1924) 70 Cal.App. 225, 235-236 [233 P. 88].)
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terrupted and factually indivisible course of driving (see People v. ](ehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715 [204 P.2d 321]) can be
split to permit multiple sentencing by application of the Neal
"intent and objective" test (55 Cal.2d at p. 19) : "Whether
a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the 'meaning of section 654
depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the
offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be
punished for anyone of such offenses but not for more than
one." That test was not designed to permit multiple sentencing that section 654 clearly forbids but to preclude improper
mUltiplication of sentences when there is at least some arguable question as to the factual divisibility of defendant's
course of criminal conduct. 6
6The Neal opinion stated its "intent and objective" test immediatelT
after it had quoted from People v. Brown, 8upra, 49 Ca1.2d 511, 591, the
comment that " Section 654 has been applied not only where there was
but one I act' in the ordinary sense . . • but also where a course ot
conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it
comprised a divisible transaction which could, be punished under more
than one statute within the meaning of section 654."
Neither Neal nor Brown presented any question of a " divisible" transaction. In each of those cases one factually indivisible act was a common
element of defendant's violation of two statutes. In Neal the defendant
threw and ignited gasoline with intent to and did commit both arson and
attempted murder. In Brown the defendant's act that was intended to
abort L also killed her. In both cases section ·654 forbade sentencing the
defendant for the two .crimes committed by the one act, and there w~
no occasion to inquire whether his offenses were or were not I I incident
to one objective."
Other decisions cited in Neal and Brown, however, show that Neal'.
I I intent and objective"
test should guide the sentencing judge in cases
presenting a "course ot action" or "transaction" that, by- oversubtle
division of the evidence of acts and intents, could be split into a series
of discrete crimes proscribed by different statutes directed against
basically the same kind of criminality. (See, e.g., People v. Kehoe, supra,
33 Ca1.2d 111, 113, 115; People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d 589, 603;
compare People v. Slobodion (1948) 31 CaI.2d 555, 562 [191 P.2d 1].)
In such cases the sentencing court is confronted with a state of facta
that mayor may not come within I I the meaning of section 654" in the
sense that, althollgh section 654 does not give a comprehensive or definitive rule enabling the solution of all multiple sentencing problems, it
does indicate a general legislative purpose of lenity so far as the multiplication of sentences is concerned. Sometimes (as in Greer) the statutes
defining the separate' crimes in themselves will enable the court to ascertain the legislative llurpose that they should not be separately punished,
without resort to section 654. If, however, there remains a doubt as to
the legislative purpose concerning the multiplication of sentences, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of lenity. (In re Tartar (1959) 52
Ca1.2d 250, 257 [339 P.2d 553]; People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Ca1.2d 575,
:i81 r150 P.2d 401]; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 CaI.2d 740, 144-745
[48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) In this class of cases "the meaning
of section 654" and the "intent Rnll objective" test direct the courts
toward lenity in the same way that a judicially recognized "basic prin·
ciple that forbids multiple punishment for one criminal act" forbids
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There is no such arguable question in this case. Even if
there were, Neal would support petitioner, for he had only the
single intent and objective to get from one place to another.
There is nothing in Neal to indicate that the intent and objective of the defendant must be criminal before it may be
deemed relevant in determining whether a course of criminal
conduct is not divisible so as to give rise to no more than one
act within the meaning of section 654. Although the Neal case
and the cases following it involved criminal intents and objectives (see cases cited in footnote 6 supra), that fact is not
controlling. It is wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence
of the defendant's intent and objective as determinative just
as it is wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence of the act
common to both crimes as determinative. It is a strange inversion that a defendant who commits an act that is the essential
and crucial element of two crimes can be punished twice if
that act by itself is innocent or the defendant's intent and
objec~ are inno~ent but can .be ~)Unished. o~ly once if the
comnion act or the mtent and obJe~bve are crImInal.
~obriner,

J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

splitting a course of conduct into multiple violations of the same
statute whenever there is a doubt as to the propriety of such fragmentation. (In re Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 395 [54 Cal.Rptr. 873,
420 P.2d 393].)
Neal's "intent and objective' , test also governs sentencing in cases
of multiple convictions for both an inchoate crime (e.g., burglary, conspiracy, solicitation, and like offenses that in fact and by definition are
committed not as ends in themselves but as preparation for the eonsummatio~ of a further criminal purpose) and substantive crimes committed
in execution of the inchoate purpose. There may Le no single external
" act ' , necessarily common to the preparatory offense and the ultimate
offense to bring the case precisely within the preclusion of section 654,
but by application of the "int~nt and objective' , test the legislative
purpose expressed by that section is effected. Illustrating this application
of Neal are People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 760-762 [26 Cal.
Bptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449] (burglary with intent to commit larceny anc1
the larceny); People v. Hicks (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 764, 765-766· [48 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747] (burglary with intent to commit sexual felonies
and the consummated sex offenses); In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.2d 685,
688 [58 Ca1.Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d 161] (same); In re Crull (1966) 64
Cal.2d 178, 180-181 [49 Cal.Rptr. 289,410 P.2d 825] (conspiracy to commit grand theft and grand theft) ; In re Romano (1966) 64 Cal.2d 826,
828 [51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798] (conspiracy, burglary, and theft) ;
In re Pratt (1967) 66 Cal.2d 154, 156 [56 Ca1.Rptr. 895, 424 P.2d 335]
(kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and robbery); In ,.e Malloy
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d. 252, 256 [57 Cal.Rptr. 345, 424 P.2d 929] (same).
Examples need not be multiplied; the principle is plain. (See Twice in
Jeopardy (1965) supra, 65 Yale L.J. 262, 319; Kirchheimer, The Act,
the Offense, and Double Jeopardy (1949) supra, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 518;
ALI Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft (1962) 11.07(1) (b),
and Tent. Draft No.5 (1956) Comment to former 11.08 at pp. 37-38.)
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